UPDATING MRIP IN 2026: IMPLICATIONS FOR SECTOR ALLOCATIONS

 

A few days ago, I happened upon an article in The Outdoor Wire which noted that the Gulf Fishery Management Council delayed fishery management actions for scamp and yellowmouth grouper

“based on uncertainty associated with private recreational landings estimates generated by the federal recreational data collection program, the Marine Resource [sic] Information Program’s Fishing Effort Survey (MRIP-FES).  The Council is hesitant to base sector allocation for the Scamp Complex (scamp and yellowmouth grouper) on MRIP-FES estimates before its Scientific and Statistical Committee can review the results of a pilot study being conducted to address MRIP-FES overestimation issues.”

For those not familiar with the “overestimation issues,” in 2023, the National Marine Fisheries Service discovered that it’s Marine Recreational Information Program was overestimating recreational fishing effort, which in turn inflated recreational catch and landings estimates.  Apparently, due to the order of questions presented in the Fishing Effort Survey, anglers were reporting that they took more fishing trips than they actually did, skewing the survey results.

In response, NMFS engaged in a multi-year process to revise the Fishing Effort Survey.  That process is now at, or very close to, completion, and revised recreational effort, catch, and landings data should be available this spring, although the rollout might be delayed by last year’s government shutdown.  The revised effort—and so catch and landings—estimates are expected to be lower than those developed prior to the survey revisions.  It appears that private-boat data will be impacted more than the data for shore-based anglers, and that data for the periods when fewer anglers fished (expressed in two-month “waves”) will face greater revisions than data from periods with higher angling activity.  The extent of the revisions will also vary from state to state.

Assuming that everything is rolled out on, or at least somewhat close to, schedule, the next question is how the new data will impact fishery management measures, possibly including the allocation of the allowable catch between the commercial and recreational sectors.

When the Marine Recreational Information Program was initially adopted, it indicated that recreational fishing effort was higher than previously believed.  NMFS stated that

“For stocks assessed to date, this increase in effort from the [Fishing Effort Survey] in historical catch estimates has generally resulted in a retrospective increase in estimates of fish stock abundance, especially for those fisheries with large recreational components.”

It almost certainly follows that, when stock assessments are conducted after the downward-revised effort data becomes available—the 2027 benchmark stock assessment for striped bass comes to mind—the estimate of stock abundance will be revised downward in response to that data.

In most fisheries, that might not have a direct effect on recreational management measures; while the spawning stock biomass of a given fish stock might be lower than previously believed, the recreational removals of fish from that stock will also be lower than previously estimated.  As long as both the estimate of biomass and the estimate of recreational removals decline by about the same percentage, the current management measures might well remain unchanged.

However, that won’t be the case in commercial fisheries, which fish on a hard-poundage quota that is based on fish abundance.  (To oversimplify the quota-setting process, managers go through a series of steps to determine how many fish, measured in pounds/metric tons, can be safely removed from a population each year.  That becomes the annual catch limit, which is divided between the commercial and recreational sectors based on predetermined allocation percentages.  The commercial allocation, as modified for management uncertainty, becomes the commercial quota.)

If the spawning stock biomass was overestimated, the commercial quota based on that overestimate was probably too large.  Some fish stocks might have been harmed as a result.  Should that prove to be the case, and a stock is found to be significantly below its biomass target, and perhaps even overfished, recreational management measures might be indirectly affected, as both commercial and recreational landings are reduced in order to rebuild that stock to its biomass target.

But it’s not only management measures—size limits, bag limits, and seasons—that might be affected by the revised estimates of recreational effort, catch, and landings.  Allocations between the commercial and recreational sectors might be revised as well.

In 2022, after the Marine Recreational Information Program showed that historical recreational landings for summer flounder, scup, and black sea bass were higher than previously believed, the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council and the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Summer Flounder, Scup, and Black Sea Bass Management Board adopted the Summer Flounder, Scup, and Black Sea Bass Commercial/Recreational Allocation Amendment.

One of the stated reasons for the amendment was that

“The commercial and recreational allocations for all three species are currently based on historical proportions of landings (for summer flounder and black sea bass) or catch (for scup) from each sector.  These allocations were set in the mid-1990s and have not been revised since that time.  Recent changes in how catch is estimated has resulted in a discrepancy between the current levels of estimated sector-specific catch and harvest and these allocations.”

In response to that discrepancy,

“For all three species, the preferred alternatives would revise the allocations using the same base years as the current allocations, updated with recent data on catch and landings in those years.  For all three species, the revised allocations would be catch-based and there would be no phase-in period.”

Thus, the amendment shifted the summer flounder allocation from 60% (of landings) commercial/40% recreational to 55% (of catch) commercial/45% recreational, shifted the black sea bass allocation from 49% (of landings) commercial/51% recreational to 45% (of catch) commercial/55% recreational, and shifted the scup allocation from 78% (of catch) commercial/22% recreational to 65% commercial/35% recreational, all based on the then-new Marine Recreational Information Program data.

Summer flounder, scup, and black sea bass were not the only species affected.  For example, also in 2022, the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council revised the red grouper allocation from 76% commercial/24% recreational to 59.3% commercial/40.7% recreational, doing so

“Because the recreational landings estimates are greater using the new survey than the previous estimates of recreational landings, the commercial-recreational allocation would shift from 76 percent and 24 percent, respectively, to 59.3% and 40.7% respectively.”

One year later, in 2023, the same council shifted the commercial/recreational allocation for greater amberjack from 27% commercial/73% recreational to 20% commercial/80% recreational, again because the new Marine Recreational Information Program Fishing Effort Survey data indicated that anglers made more trips, and caught and landed more amberjack, in the years used to determine the allocation than managers previously believed.

That leads to the obvious question:  If the revised Fishing Effort Survey data leads to estimates of anglers’ catch being reduced in the base years used to calculate allocations, will the regional fishery management councils, consistent with their actions when recreational landings were revised upward, now revisit allocations to reflect the new understanding of recreational removals during the designated base years?

While going through such an exercise might not seem worthwhile for some species, where the shift might only be a percentage point or two, in other cases, a reallocation based on lower recreational catch and harvest might bring a real benefit to the commercial sector, particularly if the estimate of spawning stock biomass, and so commercial quota under current allocations, is reduced in response to the new recreational estimates.  Under such circumstances, a reallocation based on the revised numbers might keep some commercial quotas closer to the status quo.

That doesn’t mean that reallocation will necessarily happen; regional fishery management councils aren’t required to tie allocation to historical landings, and are free to leave things as they are.

Thus, when I look at the article that gave rise to this post, I have to admit that I’m a little surprised that the Gulf Council delayed its decision on scamp and yellowmouth grouper allocation.  While waiting for the Science and Statistical Committee’s analysis was the right thing to do—fisheries decisions should always be based on the best scientific information available—the Gulf Council, at least in recent years, has demonstrated a definite slant toward the recreational sector, and it’s pretty likely that delaying action on allocation won’t benefit the recreational side at all.

So, it will be interesting to see whether the other regional fishery management councils will revisit allocations, once the revised recreational catch and landings data is released.

 

 

 

 

 

SOME THOUGHTS ON THE STRIPED BASS "WORK GROUP"

 

When the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board met last October, they failed to adopt additional conservation measures that would make it more likely that the spawning stock biomass would be rebuilt by 2029, the deadline set by the fishery management plan.  But one thing that the Board did do was agree to set up a “Work Group

“to develop a white paper that could inform a future management document.  The Work Group should include representation from all sectors in addition to scientists and managers.  The goal of this Work Group is to consider how to update the [fishery management plan’s] goals, objectives, and management of striped bass beyond 2029, in consideration of severely reduced reproductive success in the Chesapeake Bay.  The Work Group should utilize public comment, including that received during the Addendum III process to inform its research and management recommendations and work with the Benchmark [Stock Assessment Subcommittee] to incorporate ideas and deliver necessary data products.  Work group discussions should include the following topics:

·       Review [biological reference points] and consider recruitment-sensitive, model-based approaches.

·       Formally review hatchery stocking as both a research tool and a management tool for striped bass w/cost analysis.

·       Evaluate the potential for other river systems to contribute to the coastal stock.

·       Explore drivers of recruitment success/failure in Chesapeake Bay, Delaware, and the Hudson in light of changing climatic and environmental conditions, including potential impacts from invasive species.

·       Explore the reproductive contribution of large and small female fish and the implications of various size-based management tools.

·       Methods to address the discard mortality in the catch-and-release fishery.”

That gives the Work Group a very broad mandate to investigate, and provide recommendations on, striped bass management issues, and creates the potential for the Work Group to have a very positive or a very negative impact on striped bass management, and the long-term health, sustainability, and structure of the striped bass stock.  As is so often the case, it will all depend on how the Management Board decides to structure and constitute the Work Group, an issue that it will discuss when it meets at 8:30 next Wednesday morning (February 5).

One of the most important questions is who will be included among the Work Group’s members.  The ASMFC has adopted guidelines, titled the “Work Group Meeting Standard Operating Practices and Procedures,” which sets the outer limits for membership, saying

“Membership should be a limited subset of Board members approved by the Chair of the Board or the Board itself.  Ideally, members will represent diverse perspectives on the issue at hand.  WGs can request non-Board members to provide information to the WG but will not be members of the WG itself.”

That last sentence could create some problems.  As a recreational striped bass fisherman, I’m particularly sensitive to that possibility, for while the motion creating the Work Group stated that “The Work Group should include representation from all sectors in addition to scientists and managers,” the unfortunate truth is that, apart from a few people from New England and perhaps one more from Pennsylvania, I don’t believe that there are any independent recreational fishermen on the Management Board. 

There are plenty of commercial fishermen, and representatives of the for-hire fishing industry, as well as representatives of recreational industry-affiliated organizations such as the Coastal Conservation Association sitting on the Board, but finding even one recreational fisherman who isn’t beholden to the for-hire or tackle or boating industries in one way or another, and is willing to represent the shore-based and private-boat anglers’ point of view, might not be an easy job. 

Some of the state fisheries managers do a pretty good job of representing such anglers’ concerns, but while it’s nice that others might be willing to speak on your behalf, it’s always better to be able to speak for yourself.  But given the composition of the Management Board, that might be hard for anglers to do.

The fact that the motion directed the Work Group to update the fishery management plan’s goals and objectives is also something of a red flag.  Right now, Amendment 7 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass states that

“The goal of Amendment 7 to the FMP is to perpetuate, through cooperative interstate fishery management, migratory stocks of striped bass; to allow commercial and recreational fisheries consistent with the long-term maintenance of a broad age structure, a self-sustaining spawning stock; and also to provide for the restoration and maintenance of their essential habitat.”

It's not particularly clear what in that goal would need to change, even in view of the recent poor recruitment in the Chesapeake Bay and elsewhere on the coast.  Goals, after all, are aspirational, representing an end that one hopes to achieve, despite whatever obstacles lie in the way.  Continued poor recruitment might, for example, make it more difficult to maintain a “broad age structure” in the population.  Yet managing for some other goal—say, sacrificing the larger, older females in order to maintain a higher fishing mortality rate—would only make the stock more vulnerable to unexpected changes in fishing mortality or environmental conditions, something that would be patently unwise at low recruitment levels.

Similar arguments could be made for keeping the objectives unchanged.  According to Amendment 7

“In support of [the] goal, the following objectives are specified:

1.  Manage striped bass fisheries under a control rule designed to maintain stock size at or above the target female spawning stock biomass level and a level of fishing mortality at or below the target exploitation rate.

2.  Manage fishing mortality to maintain an age structure that provides adequate spawning potential to sustain long-term abundance of striped bass populations.

3.  Provide a management plan that strives, to the extent practical, to maintain coastwide consistency of implemented measures, while allowing the states defined flexibility to implement alternative strategies that accomplish the objectives of the FMP.

4.  Foster quality and economically-viable recreational, for-hire, and commercial fisheries.

5.  Maximize cost-effectiveness of current information gathering and prioritize state obligations in order to minimize costs of monitoring and management.

6.  Adopt a long-term management regime that minimizes or eliminates the need to make annual changes or modifications to management measures.

7.  Establish a fishing mortality target that will result in a net increase in abundance (pounds) of age 15 and older striped bass in the population, relative to the 2000 estimate.”

While it might be difficult, and even practically impossible, to maintain female spawning stock biomass at the target level in the face of continued poor recruitment in the Chesapeake Bay, such poor recruitment would make it even more important that fishing mortality remain at or below the target, to keep spawning stock biomass from falling even further.  And striving to maintain an age structure adequate to support the greatest possible abundance becomes an even more important objective under such circumstances, for with a dearth of young bass entering the population, the remaining older fish might be needed to jump-start a recovery when favorable spawning conditions finally occur, as they were needed to initiate the recovery of the late 1980s.

The Board also addressed the “goals and objectives” issue when Amendment 7 was being drafted five years ago.  At that time, public comment was solicited on the question, and 1,719 of those comments (98.4%) supported the goals and objectives that are currently in the plan, while only 28 supported change.  Given such lopsided opinion, it seems unreasonable to open up that discussion again.

Those issues aside, the bullet points included in the motion raise some interesting issues which, when answered, could well assist future management efforts.

The issue of biological reference points might be the most interesting of all.

Right now, the reference points used to manage the striped bass stock aren’t truly “biological,” in the sense that they weren’t developed from the model used to assess the stock.  Instead, they have been termed “empirical” reference points, based on the estimated spawning stock biomass in 1995, the year that the once-collapsed striped bass stock was deemed to be fully recovered.  Such reference points are based on observation, as the reference points calculated by the model during the last benchmark stock assessment were deemed to be “unrealistic.”

It is possible that, when the 2027 benchmark stock assessment is conducted, the model used—which might or might not be the same model used the last time—will produce calculated biological reference points.  If that occurs, such calculated reference points should certainly be adopted to manage the stock.  However, if the model again returns “unrealistic” reference points, then reference points based on 1995 spawning stock biomass ought, again, to be used.

Regardless of how the reference points are calculated, we should all understand that they are going to change from those now in effect.  It is virtually certain that the spawning stock biomass reference points will be lowered, and that the fishing mortality reference points will be amended to match that change.  That’s because the Marine Recreational Information Program’s estimates of recreational effort, catch, and landings are going to be revised ahead of the 2027 benchmark assessment, to correct for a previous overestimation of recreational effort, which inflated catch and landings data.  Since the estimate of spawning stock biomass is, in part, dependent on the estimate of recreational catch and landings, once the MRIP estimates are reduced, the estimate of biomass is going to go down, too.

That’s not a bad thing, but rather a natural step in biologists’ quest for the most accurate data.

But what we do need to look out for is one or more members of the Work Group trying to influence that group to lower the biomass target and threshold in an effort to increase commercial and/or recreational landings.  In the past, we’ve seen some Management Board members, in particular Michael Luisi of Maryland and John Clark of Delaware, try to do so, arguing that the current reference points are too high because the biomass target has only been reached for a few brief years in all the past few decades.

The flaw in their argument is that, during much of the time since 1995, and in 11 of the 14 years between 2004 and 2017, the striped bass stock was experiencing overfishing; there were few if any years since the stock was first declared to be recovered when fishing mortality was at or below the target level.  With fishing mortality at such high and unsustainable levels, it was near-miraculous that the biomass ever rose to a level even close to the target, even for just a few years.  But with fishing mortality kept to or below the target level, and assuming that recruitment also returns to historical patterns, a biomass target of 125% of 1995 levels isn’t unrealistic at all.

Of course, there is also a real chance that recruitment might remain at lower levels, due to changing environmental conditions in the Chesapeake Bay.  But should that prove to be the case, raising the fishing mortality target would be an even riskier, and even more foolish, thing to do.

Even before the Work Group is organized, the Board will have the opportunity to suggest “alternative” reference points that could be be included in the upcoming benchmark stock assessment, probably as soon as the February 5 meeting.  So the issue of reference points may be one of the most urgent items that the Worg Group will consider.

The remainder of the bullet points in the motion raise equally legitimate questions, which have either emerged in the public discussions—such as the popular, if patently incorrect argument that the decline in recruitment in the Chesapeake Bay isn’t too important, because the Chesapeake bass are just moving north and spawning in some yet-unidentified northern rivers—or are going to be key issues of striped bass management discussions going forward.

In the end, the output of the Work Group may depend largely upon the input given by its members, and those members are yet to be chosen.  Despite the clear language of the “Work  Group Meeting Standard Practices and Procedures” document, there is at least a suggestion that non-Board members may be included in the Group, as a Work Group related document provided ahead of the February 5 meeting asks the questions

“1.  What is the maximum size of the WG to ensure the group will function effectively?

2.  Will each WG seat be allocated by category type to ensure representation of the full management range and diversity of stakeholder interests?

3.  Will there be a specific nomination process, e.g. each state can nominate x number of participants?

4.  How will individuals be chosen?”

Such language neither limits Work Group participation to Board members nor clearly includes non-Board as Work Group members, but seems to at least suggest that non-Board members might be considered.

If that proves to be the case, we can only hope that independent anglers will be adequately represented.  After all, in 2024, the recreational sector accounted for about 85% of all striped bass fishing mortality, and within the sector, shore-based and private boat anglers accounted for about 98.5% of all recreational trips.  Such anglers are, by far, the largest group of stakeholders, both in numbers and in impact, in the overall striped bass fishery.  They have their own views and concerns, which are not the same of the industry organizations who might seek—and even claim—to represent them. 

In any equitable process, independent shore-based and private-boat anglers must be allowed to speak with their own voice.   

They do not seek to dominate the conversation, or to have every issue decided in their favor.  But as the largest of all of the stakeholder groups in the striped bass fishery, they have the right to a seat at the table, and to have their voice carry at least as much weight as those of the for-hire, tackle, and boating industries, who in the end depend on individual anglers for their very survival.

It is up to the Board to ensure that the right things are done.

POLITICAL FISH

 

Not too many years ago, there was a group called the Recreational Fishing Alliance that tried to influence saltwater fisheries management policy.  The group was never particularly influential or effective, at least outside of New Jersey.  It was, for all practical purposes, a vanity project conceived of and in large part financed by the wealthy owner of a well-known boatbuilding company, and was better known for getting in the way of worthwhile conservation efforts than in getting anything meaningful done.

It very deservedly ceased doing business a little over two years ago, but while it was on the wrong side of just about every fisheries management debate, there was one thing that it got completely right, and that was a bumper sticker that it sold which simply said,

“Fish are political animals.”

That’s not something that we generally like to admit.

We like to believe that the fisheries management process is a science-based endeavor, in which dedicated fisheries managers consistently apply the best scientific information available to management issues and so obtain optimum results.  But while that’s how the system is supposed to work, and while there really are a lot of very capable scientists and very dedicated professional fisheries managers out there trying their best to properly manage fish stocks, the unfortunate truth is that politics drives much of the process, a fact that frustrates the scientists and professional managers as much as it does the commercial and recreational fishermen who depend on healthy and sustainable fish stocks for the livelihoods and/or recreation.

Start by considering just who the fisheries managers are.

Here in New York, which is more-or-less similar to the management structure of most Atlantic Coast states, our marine fish are subject to three levels of management:  1) by the National Marine Fisheries Service, usually acting on the advice of the Mid-Atlantic Fisheries Management Council, 2) by the states, acting cooperatively through the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission, and 3) by the State of New York, with the advice of its Marine Resources Advisory Council.

In each of those cases, the Director of the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation’s Marine Resources Division, or their representative, has a seat at the table, where they are joined by others, who are selected in accord with the laws governing the particular management body.

In the case of the Mid-Atlantic Council, the Marine Resources Director is currently joined by three other persons (each state is guaranteed only one seat for a state manager and one other, “obligatory” seat, and must compete with other states for the “at-large” seats that become available) nominated by the governor and appointed by the United States Secretary of Commerce. 

While individuals seeking nomination can and do submit their names to the DEC, who will forward them to the executive chamber for consideration, who the governor nominates, and the order in which the nominees are listed, is a highly political process; there is no guarantee that the person most favored by the DEC will be listed as then governor’s top choice, and there have been multiple occasions when New York delayed submitting its list of nominees to the Secretary of Commerce after a politically-connected person, representing themselves or speaking for one special interest group or another, engaged in back-room politics to contest the originally-proposed list of nominees and have it altered to suit their purposes. 

Once the list of nominees is submitted to the Secretary of Commerce, the appointment process again relies on political clout, as national recreational fishing, commercial fishing, and conservation groups each try to convince the Secretary, or others farther down the chain of command, to appoint the nominee that will best represent their interests.  During the mid-2000s, the debate over who would hold a New York seat on the Mid-Atlantic Council even reached the White House and its Council on Environmental Quality; it was decided, at least in part, after a long-time fishing buddy of the president’s father—who lived in Texas, and had nothing to do with New York at all—urged the appointment of his favored candidate.

At the ASMFC, the process is simpler, but no less political.  There, each state is represented by three designated individuals, an Administrative Appointee, who is typically the state’s top marine fisheries manager, a Governor’s Appointee, and a Legislative Appointee, who often assigns their vote to a proxy.  Once again, becoming a Governor’s Appointee or a Legislative Proxy is a purely political process, with multiple interest groups vying to see that their representative is named.

Finally, there are the state management panels, which in New York takes the form of the Marine Resources Advisory Council, which is chaired by the head of the School of Marine of Marine and Atmospheric Science at Stony Brook University or their designee, and consists of seven members of the recreational fishery and seven members of the commercial fishery.  Of the seven representatives from each sector, three are appointed by the DEC, and typically represent fishermen already active in the management process, with two more appointed by the state Senate and two appointed by the state Assembly.  The political connections needed for the latter appointments are obvious, although perhaps not as egregious as the connections needed to get a seat on one southern state’s fisheries commission, which are usually awarded to the interested parties who donated the most to the governor’s last reelection campaign.

In most of the instances described above, it’s pretty clear that the ordinary citizen, unaffiliated with a politically-connected group, has about as much chance to be appointed to a management seat as a snowball has of enjoying—and surviving—a month-long stay in Hell.

So, when it comes to many management decisions, the deck is already stacked in someone’s favor—just who depends on the forum—before the debate even begins.

And, of course, the fishery being debated matters as well, because some fish just have more charisma than others, garner more public support, and so get more management attention.

Consider the winter flounder.

Averaging maybe a foot long, dull brown on one side and white on the other, with a small mouth and a twisted face that has both eyes on the same side of its head, the flounder was no one’s idea of “charismatic megafauna.”  Yet it was once the backbone of recreational fishing in states between Massachusetts and New Jersey, and supported important commercial fisheries as well.

Recreational flounder landings peaked around 1984, and then quickly began to decline along with the flounder biomass, particularly in the southern New England/mid-Atlantic region.  At about the same time, populations of Atlantic bluefin tuna and of North Atlantic swordfish were in steep decline.  While the decline of the flounder was probably at least as severe as that of the two pelagic species, when conservation organizations had a choice between depicting majestic bluefin tuna and swordfish, sleek and silver as they sped through blue water, in their fundraising materials, or depicting the humble brown flounder humping across a submerged mud flat, hunting for worms and such, charisma dictated the choice.  Public relations campaigns educated the public about the declining fortunes of the charismatic species, and put political pressure on fisheries managers to take meaningful action to end their decline.  The winter flounder enjoyed no such attention.

All of that attention certainly benefitted the big, charismatic fish.  Today, the bluefin tuna population appears to be reasonably healthy (although some disagree), while broadbill swordfish in the North Atlantic are completely recovered.  On the other hand, the spawning stock biomass of southern New England/mid-Atlantic winter flounder fell from about 50 million pounds in the early 1980s to somewhere around 7 million pounds today, and shows no signs of improvement.

Because for fish as for people, once they enter the political sphere, charisma matters.

We recently saw the same sort of thing play out here in New York.

In 2024, a bill to shut down the commercial horseshoe crab fishery was introduced in both houses of the state legislature.  The sponsors were both politicians from the west side of Manhattan, and probably didn’t spend a lot of time on the water, but instead sponsored the bill at the request of some national conservation groups that weren’t interested in the horseshoe crabs themselves, but on a bird called the red knot, which depended on horseshoe crab eggs for food, and were being seriously threatened by the decline in horseshoe crab abundance.

The problem was that the biggest red knot feeding ground, where horseshoe crab eggs were most important to the red knots, was the Delaware Bay.  While some red knots did stop along New York’s beaches during the horseshoe crab spawn, it was not the sort of feeding ground that Delaware Bay was; in fact, the next major red knot stopover were the extensive tidal flats off Massachusetts.

That didn’t mean that New York’s horseshoe crabs were doing OK.  The horseshoe crab population is broken down into local stocks, and the New York stock (which is defined to include both New York and Connecticut) is considered to be in “poor” condition relative to its historical abundance.  But New York’s fisheries managers were already trying to get on top of the problem by implementing appropriate management measures.  While the ASMFC allocated 366,272 horseshoe crabs to the state each year, the Department of Environmental Conservation limited annual harvest to just 150,000—less than half of the state allocation—and implemented closures around the full and new moons in May and June, when the animals crowded onto shallow beaches to spawn.

The measures worked so well that, by early October 2025, only 67,000 horseshoe crabs—about 45% of New York’s already-reduced 150,000 crab quota—had been landed, and the likelihood of many more being landed was slight.

But that wasn’t good enough for the political folks who, along with their various organizations, were pushing for the bill.  For them, the issue wasn’t good horseshoe crab management, but scoring a “win” by shutting down the fishery.  So they kept up the pressure, at one point even enlisting the help of the late primatologist Jane Goodall who, with all respect to her work and her memory, might not ever have seen a live horseshoe crab in her life, but was nevertheless willing to contribute her name and her cachet as a famed scientist to the cause.

Because that’s the way it goes when a fish (or other marine resource) goes political; expertise and facts carry far less weight than public relations and personal clout.

Even so, New York’s governor heeded the advice she received from the DEC and vetoed the 2024 bill.  But political pressure can be inexorable.  A new bill to close the horseshoe crab fishery was introduced early in 2025, and the various political forces redoubled their efforts to make that bill law.  Eventually, with some compromise language that would phase in the closure over four years, it was signed into law, against the advice of the DEC and the Marine Resources Advisory Council, in the waning days of the year.

In that case, political pressure by well-meaning people and organizations resulted in the passage of legislation that was probably unnecessary but, on balance, might well end up doing more good than harm.

But politics can go the other way, too.

In 2023, the ASMFC adopted Addendum XXVII to Amendment 3 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Lobster, which was initially viewed as a precautionary measure that would permit a rapid response should recruitment of Gulf of Maine and Georges Bank lobster enter a substantial decline.  At the time it was passed, no one realized that such a decline was already on the horizon, and that just months after Addendum XXVII was adopted, its new management measures, which included an increase in the minimum size, would be triggered due to a 39% crash in lobster recruitment.

Affected lobster fishermen were, for the most part, adamantly opposed to the regulatory change, and implementation was repeatedly delayed.  Eventually, the opportunities for delay began to wane, and final implementation of the new management measures was scheduled for July 1, 2025.  But the lobster fishermen weren’t having any of that.  Having failed to further delay implementation at the ASMFC, they turned to political remedies.

The debate probably hit its nadir after New Hampshire’s Republican governor, Kelly Ayotte, wrote a letter to the ASMFC which read, in part,

“I have heard loud and clear from our lobstermen, commercial fishermen, and concerned legislators and citizens from our Seacoast that this minimum size increase will have a negative impact on an industry already strained by existing regulations.  To ensure the survival of an iconic and historical industry in our state and our region, and to ensure our nation remains competitive in global trade, I ask you today to rescind these new guidelines.  In the meantime, New Hampshire will comply with the previous minimum size for lobster in an effort to preserve this proud industry.”

Just in case anyone failed to understand that her letter represented a gentle way of telling the ASMFC to kiss off, she also put up a post on X.com (formerly “Twitter”) which read

“New Hampshire will not comply with burdensome regulations that harm our lobstermen.

“We will protect this iconic and historic industry nin our state.”

The text was accompanied by an image featuring a star, a lobster, and the words

“COME AND TAKE IT.”

Normally, the ASMFC’s response to such defiance would be to find the state out of compliance with its fishery management plan and, in accordance with the terms of the Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management Act, forward its finding to the Secretary of Commerce who, after finding that New Hampshire was, in fact, out of compliance with a management provision necessary for the conservation of the lobster fishery, would impose a moratorium on that fishery until the state chose to comply.

However, faced with defiance by a governor who belonged to the same political party as the President of the United States, and given that, during his first term, that President had already issued an Executive Order seeking to deregulate the nation’s commercial fisheries, which suggested that his Commerce Secretary would not find New Hampshire out of compliance (and also facing resistance from fishermen in other states), the American Lobster Management Board backed down and eventually adopted a new addendum that revoked then challenged management measures.

Politics had defeated science once again.

Which brings us to Atlantic menhaden, which may be the most political fish of all.

No one with any credibility will deny that menhaden are a very important forage fish all along the East Coast.  But for many years, and particularly after the publication of a book titled The Most Important Fish in the Sea, which was written by a non-scientist and cultural historian who exaggerated  the species’ role in coastal ecosystems, menhaden management has been badly politicized.  Much of that politicization revolved around the fact that most menhaden are landed by what is known as the “reduction fishery,” a fishery involving very large, very visible boats which deploy very large purse seines capable of capturing an entire school of fish in one set.  The fact that such vessels are owned and operated by a single company, Ocean Harvesters, and sell to a single buyer, Omega Protein Corporation, which is owned by a very large Canadian fisheries products company, Cooke Inc., only inflames the debate.

The notion of a single corporation conducting an industrial-scale fishery for menhaden just seems to rub folks the wrong way, perhaps because it offends their notion of commercial fishermen as strong, independent operators who risk their lives taking small boats out into a big ocean in order to bring home seafood that will feed the public.  The actual number of menhaden being caught, and scientists’ stock assessments declaring that the menhaden stock is neither overfished nor experiencing overfishing, seem to take up little room in their arguments, which mostly revolve around claims that the reduction fleet’s activities lead to “localized depletion” of menhaden, even though localized depletion has never yet been established—or even adequately defined.

In that sort of environment, it’s probably not surprising to see that the Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership has announced that it’s hiring a public relations agency to assist it with its menhaden management campaign, to

“highlight the far-reaching impacts of menhaden management decisions, engage anglers, conservationists, and policymakers through strategic media outreach and storytelling.”

Storytelling, not science, because they’re engaging at the political level, where telling the right story is all that matters. 

It’s not an effort to educate the public, which would be based on stock assessments and hard data, but rather an effort to propagandize the public, by telling stories that tug at the emotions rather than providing facts that tug at the intellect.

It’s probably an effort at greenwashing, too, prosecuted by an organization that tried to undercut federal red snapper management in the Gulf of Mexico and more recently opposed proposed measures to conserve Atlantic striped bass and make it more likely that the spawning stock biomass would be fully rebuilt by the 2029 deadline established in the fishery management plan.

It’s unfortunate, but in the political side of fisheries management, perceptions always trump facts, and the organizations with the money and political clout to propagandize the public and impact the management process nearly always come out ahead.

Which means that until conservation-minded anglers figure out how to come together and invest their time and financial assets in the political process, they will always be left behind.

IF VIRGINIA LEAVES THE ASMFC...

 

Different people view the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission in different ways.

Some, and I am among them, view the Commission as an essential tool in East Coast fisheries management which, thanks to the provisions of the Atlantic Striped Bass Conservation Act and the Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management Act, can cut through the rivalries and jealousies that inevitably arise among coastal states, and develop legally enforceable fisheries management plans to conserve and sustainably manage shared marine resources.

Others, and I am among them, too, view the ASMFC as an organization that has fallen short of its potential, by too often subordinating science and long-term sustainability to short-term economic concerns, and subordinating the greater public interest to the interests of various members of the commercial and recreational fishing industries.

And still others view the Commission as an obstacle to their own and/or their constituents’ predatory ways, and fishermen’s ability to exploit living marine resources for maximum immediate profit with no concerns for the future impacts of their actions.

It appears that at least one Virginia politician, state Senator Richard H. Stuart (R-Montross) falls into the latter category, for on January 15, 2026, he introduced Virginia Senate Bill No. 414, a bill that

“Removes authorization for the Commonwealth’s membership in the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Compact.  The bill directs the Marine Resources Commission, on or after February 1, 2027, to take all actions necessary and appropriate to effect the Commonwealth’s renunciation of and withdrawal from the Compact and to complete such actions no later than July 1, 2027.  The bill also directs the Commission, no later than July 31, 2026, to provide written notice to all states that are a party to the Compact that the Commonwealth intends to renounce and withdraw from the Compact.  Finally, the bill removes from the Menhaden Management Advisory Committee the Virginia appointee to the Atlantic Menhaden Technical Committee of the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission.”

It probably comes as a surprise to no one that Senator Stuart represents Virginia’s 25^th Senate district, the same district that includes the unincorporated community of Reedville, where the East Coast menhaden harvesting and processing facilities of Omega Protein Corp. and its primary supplier, Ocean Harvesters, are located.

It is also probably not a surprise that, according to the Virginia Mercury news website, Sen. Stuart was the single largest recipient of political contributions from Omega Protein in 2023.  The Fredricksburg Free Press reported that, as of July 13, 2025, he had received $32,843 from Omega Protein over the years that he had been in office.

Sen. Stuart looks out for his corporate patron, and when the ASMFC threatens to curtail their fishing activities, as would happen should its Atlantic Menhaden Management Board decide to reduce the total allowable catch of menhaden in 2027 and 2028 when it meets later this year, severing Virginia’s ties with the Commission apparently seems to be his preferred course of action.

It’s a path that Sen. Stuart has traveled before, for he filed a similar bill in January 2012, after the Atlantic Menhaden Management Board voted to substantially reduce menhaden landings when it met late in the previous year.

Of course, the 2012 bill did little more than express Sen. Stuart’s, and/or the menhaden industry’s, pique at the new regulations, and it’s hard to see S. 414 doing anything more, particularly given the makeup of both houses of the Virginia legislature and the relatively progressive stances on other issues already taken by the state’s new governor, Abigail Spanberger.

But what if S. 414 managed to overcome all of the headwinds currently prevailing against it, and the bill somehow managed to be signed into law?

Would Virginia suddenly be able to manage its state-waters fisheries unimpeded by the ASMFC and federal law, even if its actions could potentially degrade the health of fisheries along much of the Atlantic coast?  Or might its withdrawal from the Commission give Virginia far less freedom to act independently than Sen. Stuart seems to assume?

Those aren’t easy questions to answer, because no state has yet tried to withdraw from interstate compact that created the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission, and lacking such precedent, all of the courts that would ultimately rule on the matter—and it is not at all unlikely that such matter might finally make it all the way to the United States Supreme Court—would be faced with a case of first impression, and would be able to exercise significant discretion when forming their opinions.

But there would still be federal law and, ultimately, the Constitution of the United States, to guide their way.

In trying to figure out what would happen should Virginia withdraw from the ASMFC, the best place to start is probably the Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management Act, which was passed in 1993 and gave the ASMFC the authority to draft coastwide management plans that all of the Atlantic coast states would be required to follow.  My use of the phrase “Atlantic coast states” rather than “ASMFC member states” was intentional, for the word “member” never appears in the statute, while the phrase “interstate compact” only appears in the definition of the term “Commission,” which means

“the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission established under the interstate compact consented to and approved by the Congress in Public Laws 77-539 and 81-721.”

Instead, the statute simply refers to each of the member states, including Virginia, as a “State,” a term defined as

“Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, the District of Columbia, or the Potomac River Fisheries Commission.”

Thus, when the statute provides that

“The Commission shall prepare and adopt coastal fishery management plans to provide for the conservation of coastal fishery resources…The coastal fishery management plan shall specify the requirements necessary for States to be in compliance with the plan.  Upon adoption of a coastal fishery management plan, the Commission shall identify each State that is required to implement and enforce that plan [emphasis added],”

the plain language suggests that Congress didn’t intend to limit the ASMFC’s authority only to signatories to the interstate compact, but rather that it intended to extend the Commission’s authority over every “State” as defined in the law.

Similarly, when the statute requires that

“Each State identified [pursuant to the previously-quoted paragraph] shall implement and enforce the measures of such plan within the timeframe established in the plan [emphasis added],”

and provides that

“The Commission shall determine that a State is not in compliance with the provisions of a coastal fishery management plan if it finds that the State has not implemented and enforced such plan within the timeframes established under the plan…Upon making any [such] determination…the Commission shall within 10 working days notify the Secretaries [of Commerce and the Interior] of such determination… [emphasis added, formatting omitted]”

and, upon such notification, that

“Within 30 days after receiving [such a] notice from the Commission…and after review of the Commission’s determination of noncompliance, the Secretary [of Commerce] shall make a finding on whether the State in question has failed to carry out its responsibility [to implement and enforce the provisions of a coastal fishery management plan]; and if so, whether the measures that a State has failed to implement and enforce are necessary for the conservation of the fishery in question,  [emphasis added, formatting omitted]”

and

“Upon making a finding…that a State has failed to carry out its responsibility [to implement and enforce the provisions of a coastal fishery management plan] and that the measures it failed to implement and enforce are necessary for conservation, the Secretary shall declare a moratorium on fishing in the fishery in question within the waters of the noncompliant State…  [emphasis added]”

the language seems to express Congress’ clear intent to empower the ASMFC to require every state between Maine and Florida, along with the District of Columbia and the Potomac River Fisheries Commission, to comply with the Commission’s coastal fishery management plans, and does not anywhere suggest that a state’s membership in the interstate compact creating the ASMFC is a prerequisite for the Commission to exercise and enforce its management authority.

Thus, Sen. Stuart’s bill could well be an exercise of futility—if not something worse for Virginia--because Virginia’s withdrawal from the Atlantic State Marine Fisheries Commission would not free Virginia from its duty to comply with the Commission’s Atlantic menhaden management plan, although it would mean that Virginia would no longer have a seat or a vote on the Atlantic Menhaden Management Board, and would lose its current ability to contribute to the development of menhaden management measures.

That was the conclusion reached by the Attorney General of North Carolina who, in an opinion dated April 7, 1995, advised that

“if North Carolina legally effects withdrawal from the ASMFC, the State would continue to have to implement ASMFC fisheries management plans, but would have no voting privileges on the Commission.”

The opinion went on to say that

“it is our belief that the [Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management] Act reasonably supports only a conclusion that its requirements fully apply to all jurisdictions wherein ‘coastal fisheries resources’ occur, and not just Commission member states.  As a result, North Carolina’s withdrawal from the ASMFC would not have the result of the State no longer being subject to the terms of the Act, including its requirement that each affected state implement and enforce ASMFC fishery management plans.  Instead, it would appear that the result of a withdrawal from the ASMFC would be that North Carolina would be held to the terms of any Commission fishery management plans, without the benefit of voting on those plans or otherwise exercising the powers of Commission member states to influence plan development and adoption.”

Since it seems very likely that the Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management Act would require a state to implement and enforce ASMFC coastal fishery management plans, even if that state was no longer a member of the Commission, the only way a state might escape the obligations created by the statute would be to attack and attempt to invalidate the statute itself as an unconstitutional act of Congress.

There are two possible avenues for a Constitutional attack on the statute.  The first is an attack based on the Compact Clause of the Constitution, the same clause which authorizes the creation of interstate compacts such as the one that created the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission.  The Compacts Clause states that

“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.”

Based on that clause, the argument might be made that Congress could not impose new conditions on a compact that had already been agreed to by the states and ratified by Congress.  However, given the power granted to Congress under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, which grants Congress the authority

“to regulate commerce with foreign nations, among states, and with the Indian tribes,”

Congress probably was within its rights to adopt the Act, given Atlantic coast fisheries’ economic importance to the nation.

The North Carolina Attorney General came to that conclusion as well, in an opinion dated March 26, 1996.  That opinion also considered the other possible Constitutional challenge to the Act, one based on the Tenth Amendment, which provides that

“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.”

An attack on the Act based on the Tenth Amendment might have the best chance of success, due to a 1992 decision issued by the United States Supreme Court, which found that the federal government may not “commandeer” a state’s authority by compelling it to adopt laws or rules intended to carry out federal policies.  Because only the states have the ability to implement the provisions of the ASMFC’s coastal fishery management plans, even though it is federal law that gives the Commission the coercive power to compel the states to implement and enforce such plans, it is very possible that the Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management Act might not survive a Tenth Amendment challenge.

The North Carolina Attorney General recognized that the Act might be vulnerable to such a challenge, but also noted that

“two practical considerations might cause the court not to apply [such reasoning] to the Atlantic Coastal Act.  Experience has confirmed the interjurisdictional fisheries cannot be managed effectively without a federally empowered agency able to control the states, or fishermen licensed by states.  The Congressional history of the Atlantic Coastal Act, as well as its ‘Findings and Purposes’ section, make that fact indisputable as a matter of law.  Additionally, the history of the Act shows the states sought this form of regulation instead of direct control by the traditional federal fisheries management agency, the Department of Commerce.”

However, thirty years after that opinion was released, federal courts have become more sympathetic to “states’ rights” arguments, and it is not at all clear that practical considerations would prevail over a political ideology that seeks to limit the power of federal regulatory bodies.

Thus, should Virginia, or any other state, choose to withdraw from the ASMFC in 2026 or in future years, the Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management Act would, in all probability, still require such state to abide by the ASMFC’s coastal fishery management plans.  But there is no guarantee that the Act itself would survive a Constitutional challenge based on the Tenth Amendment, and the argument that, by passing the Act, Congress unconstitutionally commandeered the authority of the states to manage their own state-waters fisheries.

Given the importance of consistent coastwide fisheries management measures, ensured by the existence of enforceable coastwide fishery management plans, we can only hope that such challenge to the Act never occurs, and if it does, that the courts will understand the practical need to keep such management plans in place.

But neither outcome is guaranteed.

 

 

 

A FRESH LOOK AT SHARK DEPREDATION

 

Most sharks eat fish.  And like any predator, while they are capable of successfully hunting healthy prey, they are attracted to the easy kill, to prey that is sick, wounded, disabled—or tethered by an angler’s line.

As fishery management efforts show some success, and depressed populations of some shark species begin to rebuild, shark depredation—the term used to describe sharks striking a fish already hooked on an angler’s line or caught in a commercial fisherman’s gear—is becoming a bigger and bigger issue.  It seems that, while fishermen have no compunctions about catching and keeping fish that constitute the sharks’ usual prey, they get very upset when the tables are turned and a shark snatches a fish from an angler’s line.

Thus, we now have Congress debating the so-called “SHARKED Act,” which would create a “shark depredation task force” which would

“develop ways to improve coordination and communications across the fisheries management community and shark research community to address shark depredation,”

identify research priorities and funding opportunities related to topics relevant to the depredation issue,

“develop recommended management strategies to address shark depredation; and coordinate the development and distribution of educational materials to help the fishing community minimize shark interactions including through changed angler behavior and expectations.  [original formatting omitted]”

The Act also calls for the development of

“Projects to better understand shark depredation, including identifying what causes increases in shark depredation and determining how to best address shark depredation.”

Although the SHARKED Act has yet to pass the Senate, and its provisions have not yet been signed into law, it seems that a biologist employed by the Bonefish and Tarpon Trust has been conducting his own project to understand shark depredation in the Florida Keys and, at least with respect to one important corner of Florida Bay, he may be coming up with some interesting answers.

Dr. Jose Emilio Trujillo set about his task two years ago, working with anglers and fishing guides in the region to gather their experiences with shark depredation, focusing on the most popular recreational species:  snook, tarpon, red drum, bonefish, and permit.  He found that, throughout the Keys, about 10% of hooked bonefish, permit, and tarpon fell victim to shark depredation.  But he also found something else—in the popular fishing grounds near Flamingo, Florida, 31% of hooked snook and 23% of hooked red drum were lost to depredating sharks.

While four shark species—great hammerheads, blacktips, bull sharks, and lemon sharks—were responsible for the depredation events, it was lemon sharks that snatched most of the snook and red drum lost in the Flamingo area.

Not all lemon sharks engaged in that behavior.  According to an article in the South Florida SunSentinel, Dr. Trujillo found that

“there were two groups of lemon sharks using Flamingo—‘resident’ that were Flamingo homebodies and ‘transient’ who would often leave the area.

“About 28% of those sharks focused their time on known fishing hot spots that anglers would use on a regular basis.

“Fishing boats show up at those hot spots about 8 a.m.  The sharks tended to show up just before that.

“One shark tracked for more than 100 days came ‘over and over’ to a specific hot spot.”

So for that particular group of lemon sharks, at least, depredation might be a learned behavior.

But it may also be a behavior that has been forced on the sharks as a result of changes to the ecosystem in the Flamingo region, where sea grasses have experienced significant die-offs.  As Dr. Trujillo observed,

“Changes in the seagrass basically resonate in the whole community, in the whole ecosystem.  And we know that seagrass die-offs have resulted in declines in prey.”

It’s very possible that the lemon sharks around Flamingo have turned to depredating anglers’ fish because their more usual prey has become less abundant.  Dr. Trujillo has pointed to studies, conducted during the 1990s, which found that lemon sharks fed on small fish typical of the seagrass ecosystem, such as pinfish, toadfish, and mullet, and rarely preyed upon snook or red drum.  But in his recent studies, he has found that about 30% of the lemon sharks had been feeding, at least in part, on snook, something that he characterized as “very odd.”

He noted that

“No study until now has reported lemon sharks eating large prey like gamefish that are a high trophic level species.  The fact that we are finding snook in their diet is…not normal.  That indicated that they are obtaining this resource through a new way of hunting, which we believe is depredation.”

A stock assessment released in 2021 reported,

“Results suggest Lemon Shark stock abundance [off the southeastern United States] has been relatively stable since the mid-1990s, with some estimates of prior depletion.  Estimates of relative fishing mortality indicate earlier periods of overfishing with a decrease in fishing mortality since the early 2000s.”

At the same time,

“Life history characteristics suggest the Lemon Shark is vulnerable to exploitation.  In recent years, there is some evidence that Lemon Shark catch rates have declined and nursery sites have been negatively impacted by anthropogenic pressures off the southeastern USA.  These factors have increased conservation concerns and led to changes in fishery management.  For example, the Florida Fish and Wildlife Commission added Lemon Sharks to the prohibited species list in 2010, preventing their harvest in Florida state waters.  [citations omitted]”

Thus, the increased levels of depredation by lemon sharks seems driven by a change in behavior rather than a change in lemon shark abundance.

Still, the knee-jerk reaction of many recreational fishermen to the depredation is to call out for more sharks to be killed, in order to decrease the competition for limited marine resources.  I was appointed to the National Marine Fisheries Service’s Highly Migratory Species Advisory Panel in 2024, and in the four meetings I’ve attended so far, none have passed without someone in the recreational fishing community complaining about shark depredation, and calling for some sort of effort to reduce shark numbers.

The same sentiments exist in southwest Florida; the SunSentinel article quotes a local angler named Collin Ross, who complained that

“You can’t get away from the sharks.  They’re all over the place.  It is a huge issue…

“You used to be able to fish without any type of issues, and now you fish some areas and you have to leave immediately because of the sharks.”

Mr. Ross admits that he doesn’t know why shark depredation has increased.

“All we know is there are a lot more sharks in areas where people are fishing.  Why are they congregating?  Is there an overpopulation?  I don’t know.”

Yet, while he admits that he doesn’t know why depredation is occurring, he seems to think that he knows how to address it.

“We’re hoping that the [Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission] allows changes to federal law around lemon sharks, and then the guides can take it into their own hands and they can cull sharks as they see fit.”

“Cull sharks.”  Just kill them off because, I suppose, it is always easier to blame the sharks for the problem, and start killing them, than it is to address the real issue of seagrass loss.  One United States Geological Survey publication suggests that restoring the seagrass of the Florida Bay and Everglades watersheds would take about 20 years and cost approximately 7.8 billion dollars, and would not only require restoring fresh water flows into Florida Bay, but also ensuring that the water flowing in doesn’t carry pollutants that would increase the Bay’s nutrient load, and actually make the current problems worse.

Killing sharks is certainly quicker and cheaper than that, so it has many supporters, even if it is the wrong response to the problem.